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LAWBREAKERS, COURTS, AND LAW-ABIDERS
By Roger J. Traynor, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of California

A recluse who confined his reading to the headlines that regularly
scream of crime might well imagine that ordinary people live in constant
fear of injury or death at the hands of violent criminals. Only if he went
out into the world would he discover that they stand in danger of much
else that is fearful, and he might be surprised that on the whole they
stand it rather well. He would see that law-abiding people not only overwhelmingly outnumber those engaged in crime but that they have wellarmed police forces on their side, alert to track down lawbreakers.' He
would see that in the courts lawbreakers are regularly brought to justice.
He would see that places of detention everywhere are chronically overcrowded. He would realize that if the millenium ever arrived when every
lawbreaker is found out, our present walls of confinement would never
hold them all. We would then have to envisage crime control in larger
terms than incarceration, unless we wanted to billet lawbreakers in our
homes.2
*Text of the fourteenth annual Earl F. Nelson Memorial Lecture, delivered
March 4, 1966 at the University of Missouri.
i. In 1964 the population of the United States was approximately 191 mil-

lion. U. S.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS

(1964)

[hereinafter cited as U.C.R.]. As of December 31, 1964, there were 214,356 adult
prisoners confined in state and federal institutions for felony offenses. The ratio of
prisoners confined to the civilian population was 112.5 per 100,000. See U. S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF PRISONS, NATIONAL PRISONER STATISTICS 1 (1965).
In 1964, the national clearance or police solution rate of reported crimes was
24.5 per cent. National clearance rates for the crimes of murder, forcible rape, and
aggravated assault, however, were all over 66 per cent of those reported. U.C.R.
21-22. It is reasonable to suppose that the clearance rate will increase in proportion to improvements in the compensation and training of police personnel and in
scientific methods of crime detection.
In 1964, the national police employee rate for all cities was 1.9 police per
1,000 people. In the suburbs it was 1.3 per 1,000 people and in the sheriffs' departments it was .9 per 1,000 people. U.C.R. 32-33.
2. "[Alrrest, conviction, and punishment of every criminal would be a
catastrophe. Hardly one of us would escape, for we have all at one time or another

committed acts that the law regards as serious offenses." Schwartz, On Current
Proposals to Legalize Wire Tapping, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1954).

@1966 by the Curators of the University of Missouri.
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jurisdiction, wherein the records on appeal were filed [in
civil cases.] not less than [17] 30 days prior to the date of
the session[,]. [and in criminal cases not less than 12 days
prior to the date of the session.]* Any appeal may, by order
of the presiding judge or the department, be placed on the
calendar for hearing at any session of the department.

Rule 105.

Briefs

(a) [Time for filing] In civil and criminal cases the appellant shall file an opening brief within [9] 15 days after
the filing of record on appeal, and the respondent shall file
a brief within [14] 10 days after the filing of [the record on
appeal] appellant's opening brief, and the appellant may file
a reply brief within [17] 5 days after the filing of [the
record] respondent's brief, but not later than the time of the
hearing. [In criminal cases, the appellant shall file an opening brief within 6 days and the respondent shall file a brief
within 10 days after the filing of the record of appeal, and
the appellant may file a reply brief within 12 days after the
filing of the record but not later than the time of the hearing.] Any party may join another party or other parties in
a brief or may adopt by reference any brief in the same or
a companion case.

*Matter in brackets deleted.
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Meanwhile the scare headlines are reinforced by scare articles and
speeches in such large force as to induce at least transient frights even
in ordinary people. The alarmists would make recluses or vigilantes of
us all, destroying the confidence of people in their own powers of observation and thought. It is time we confront the fearmongers who are confusing
the public's perspective on the age-old problem of crime and confounding
the confusion by singling out courts as scapegoats.
To begin with, crime is no new phenomenon in our own country or
any other.8 We keep more records on it than many countries do, and they
are steadily improving. Hence what appears to be a formidable record of
crime in this country also bears witness to such a formidable bent for
statistics as to suggest not that we harbor more outlaws per thousand
than other countries do, but that we harbor more bookkeepers.
If few countries are affluent enough to hire enough scribes to keep
up with crime, our own is far from keeping up with it all. What little we
are learning hurts us, but it hurts us no more than what we formerly
did not know.' Today's statistics have so far advanced beyond the records
of the past as to afford no basis for invidious comparisons of the crime
of today and that of yesterday. Moreover, they are meaningful only in
the context of other data revealing revolutionary changes in our way of
life. Where once we were a nation predominantly of rural dwellers, and
most people knew their neighbors, we are now predominantly a nation of
urban denizens jostling our way among strangers with a minimum of
urbanity.5 Where once we built up tolerance for steam whistles, for the
3. On the recurrence of crime waves in the United States, see notes 16-25
infra. Many scholars warn against drawing hasty conclusions from crime statistics.
See Beattie, Criminal Statistics in the United States, 51 J. CRM. L., C. & P.S.
49, 54 (1960); Bell, What Crime Wave? Fortune, Jan. 1955, pp. 96, 98; Wechsler,
A Caveat on Crime Control, 27 J. CaM. L., C. & P.S. 629, 637 (1937). See also
Kamisar, Public Safety v. Irdividual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53
J. CrM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 187 (1962). As to the seriousness of the crime problem
in other countries see Neville, The New Mafia is Deadlier, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12,
1964, § 6 (Magazine) p. 22; Samuels, Crime Wave in "Law-Abiding" England,
N.Y. Times, May 3, 1962, § 6 (Magazine) p. 64; Newsweek, Sept. 14, 1964, p. 42
(Japan); U. S. News & World Report, April 26, 1965, p. 13 (Canada).
4. We have taken only the first tentative steps toward applying statistical
and empirical research to the problems of criminal law. See Beattie, supra note 3, at
65; Foote, The Proper Role of theUnited States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 468473 (1964); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest,
52 Nw. UL. REv. 16, 27-36 (1957); Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested
Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 21, 33 (1961).

5. In the first fifty years of this century the ratio of urban to rural dwellers
in the United States was reversed from 40/60 in 1900 to 64/36 in 1950. The 1960
census reported an urban majority of 70 per cent, but with a definite shift from
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clickety-clack of industrial machines and their giant roars and sputters,
we must now also build up tolerance for the chattering computers. Upward
goes progress, uprooting everything in sight. Down goes our sense of
identity.
There are revolutionary changes also in the make-up of the population. The least disturbing is that people live longer, for however spry
they remain, their exuberance knows some bounds. Theirs is a relatively
quiet readjustment, even when they lose their innocence by association
with grandchildren who no longer wish on a star but compute its distance
by rocket. The salient change is the current accent on youth.6 The young
are dominant not only in number but in voice; they make themselves
heard as well as seen. They act their age, in the double sense. They
act with the unruly energy of youth and react to the turbulence of the
age in which they live. It should come as no surprise that they dominate
the annals of crime.7
The crimes of the young against society bear close relation to their
youth. One of their most common offenses is automobile theft,8 and in
that offense they reflect a value that their elders appear to prize even
more dearly than liquor, cigarettes, cosmetics, and the vicarious sex offercentral cities to their surrounding suburbs. U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (1965).
6. Those 65 years old and over constituted 4 per cent of the population in
1900 and 9 per cent in 1960. Nevertheless, in 1960 for the first time in American
history, the median age of the American population decreased because there was
a larger proportionate increase in the under-20 age group than in any other. Of
approximately 180 million persons living in the United States in 1960, 69 million
were 19 years of age or under. See laISsH & PROTHRO, THE PouiTICS oF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 31 (3d ed. 1965); U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1965).
7. "A review of total arrests of persons under the age of 18 reveals a continued upswing in their involvement with police. The nationwide increase in all
arrests, again excluding traffic for persons under 18 was 17 per cent. In cities . . .,
arrests of these young persons rose 17 per cent. Suburban and rural areas recorded
21 per cent and 22 per cent increases each. Thirty per cent of the total arrests in
suburban areas were for persons under 18, 20 per cent in cities and in the rural
areas young people made up 19 per cent of arrests for all criminal acts." U.C.R.
24 (1964). In short, the age group of people under 18 accounted for more than
20 per cent of total national arrests. The group ranging from ages 18 to 29 accounted for almost another 30 per cent of total national arrests. U.C.R. 108. See
also GLUECK & GLUECK, PREDICTING DELINQUENCY AND CRIME (1959).
S. In 1964, there were 463,000 automobile thefts, a 16 per cent increase over
1963. The police were able to arrest the person or persons responsible in 26 per
cent of these cases. Sixty-four per ccnt of those arrested for auto theft were under
18; 89 per cent were under 25. "The increase in auto theft arrests for persons under
18 in the past 5 years has more than doubled the growth of the young age population 10-17 years which is primarily identified with this crime." U.C.R. 19-20
(1964); see Savitz, Automobile Theft, 50 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 132, 133 (1959).
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ings that multiply like rabbits to attend tax-deductible repasts,9 and of
course more dearly than intangible values that have no price tag, let
alone the accoutrements of status.10
The significant fact about young offenders is that their first offense is
often their last." Nevertheless first offenses swell the statistics of crime
known to most only by their totals. The public is rarely informed that
a substantial number of the crimes of the young are not only first and
last offenses, but also nonviolent crimes against property, not people.12
The spotlight is on the occasional violent crimes of the young. In this
regard we do well to remember that in a time of accelerating mobility
the hostile encounters on our streets are less between Greek and Greek,
or even between Greek and barbarian, than between recently-arrived young
strangers who see each other as barbarians and are quick to give and
to take offense. 13 Moreover for all their bravado, it is the young who
bear the most damaging wounds of upheavals in family relations attendant upon the widespread upheavals of a mobile society.' 4 They also feel
with particular sharpness the mass violence of this century's wars. It
may be deplorable, but it is not wholly inexplicable, that they sometimes
react violently to so emotionally disturbed a world, riddled with the
hostilities of their elders.
9. In 1964, approximately 72 million passenger cars were registered in the
United States. The average urban family spends more than $700 a year in the
purchase and operation of an automobile, a figure exceeded only by the amounts
spent on food -and housing. See U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 346, 549 (1965). See also BLOCH &
NIEDERHOFFER,

THE

GANG 183-185 (1958); KEATS,

THE INSOLENT CHARIOTs

(1958).

10. In recent years, education has gained status on the basis of its monetary

value. See HARRIS, THE MARKET FOR COLLEGE GRADUATES 34-43, 117-146 (1949);
Miller, Annual and Lifetime Income in Relation to Education: 1939-1959, 50 AM.
EcoN. REv. 962 (1960); Morgan & David, Education and Income, 77 Q.J. OF
EcoNoMIcs 423 (1963).
11. See Laulecht, A Study of Recidivism in One Training School, 1962 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 161; Mannering, Significant Characteristics of Recidivistsr, 4
N.P.A.A., 211, 213 (1958).
12. "The young age group, 10-17 years, makes up about 15 per cent of our

national population but commits 43 per cent of all the property crimes-burglary,
larceny and auto theft-based on police solutions." U.C.R. 22. On the other hand,
based on police solutions (clearance rates), persons under 18 were responsible for
only 5 per cent of all murders, 9 per cent of aggravated assaults and 14 per cent
of forcible rapes. U.C.R. 87, Table 10.
13. BLOCH & NIEDERHOFFER, THE GANG 14, 161-182 (1958); CLOWARD, DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY 194-199 (1960).
14. See S. & E. T. GLUECK, FAMILY ENVIRONMENT AND DELINQUENCY (1962);
S. & E. T. GLUECK, UNRAVELLING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (1950); E. T. Glueck,
Toward Improving the Identification of Delinquents, 53
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 164
(1%2). See also ERICKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY, 306-325 (2d ed. 1963).

J.
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We may never reach a definitive consensus on the interpretation of
crime statistics enveloped in so complicated a background. Nevertheless we
have a responsibility at least to read the statistics in the perspective of
correlative data.
There is an aggravated complication: statistics encompass violations of
a growing host of statutory prohibitions, crimes per se even when they
involve no victim and no violence. Whatever the wisdom of such statutory
prohibitions as are prompted by community mores, it may still remain debatable whether the behavior prohibited should be labelled a crime and
punished as such or dealt with in some other manner.15 Those who are
quick to say, whenever something displeases them, that "there ought to be
a law," fail to realize that each new law increases the chances that they
too may become lawbreakers.
Even in simpler times crime was a problem complicated enough to
resist solution." Since the early days of the Republic alarmists have described the crime of their day as a wave, without any reminder that where
there's a wave there's an ocean. Waves have been pounding against domestic tranquility since the Founding Fathers, aware of how lively a deadly
sin could be, began the alphabet of undomesticated crime with the Scarlet Letter A. The gluttonous among them, the prideful, the covetous, the
angry, the envious, the slothful, all these deadly sinners went on record
against lust. This righteous company proceeded from flaming A's to
firedoomed W's, and for the witches punishment was swift and severe
enough to satisfy the most vengeful law-abiders. One can imagine that

15. See ALLEN, Problemsr of "Socializing" Criminal Jsice in the Border.
land of Criminal Jwsice in THE BORDERLAND OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 1, 3-5 (1964);
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 67 (1964).

16. Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., who has canvassed past records, reminds us that "the available data suggest that the characteristic crimes of the late
eighteenth century were the same offenses that today cause outcry against constitutional immunities. Little public emotion stirs today because of such latevintage crimes as Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations, or ingenious offenses
under the Securities Exchange Act. People, quite understandably, get angered and
alarmed at robbery, rape, and murder. Our forefathers committed these same crimes
of bodily violence and depredation. The Bill of Rights of 1791 and state constitutions and statutes, adopted and enacted and reenacted from that time to our time,
were devised precisely to make prosecution and conviction of these and other
crimes more difficult. ... The Founding Fathers . . . knew exactly what they were
about. The question is whether we intend to carry out their mandate." Sutherland,

Crime and Confession, 79 HAav. L. REv. 21, 34-35 (1965); see also SEMMB, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MARYLAND (1938); WEISS & WEISS, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT

IN COLONIAL NEw JnSEY

(1960).
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even the slothful who would bestir themselves for no other entertainment,
would not miss the closing night of a witch who would go up in smoke.
Generation after generation the waves of crime went on pounding."
The nineteenth century was no less violent than the eighteenth.' 8 In the relatively tranquil years of the early twentieth century, still tinged with
mauve, crime regularly made headlines to break the peace. 19 World War I
came and went, but crime continued. 20 The years of Prohibition from
1920 to 1933 put criminals in business and brought home the sorry lesson
that crime pays when it consists of supplying prohibited goods or services
to self-styled law-abiding citizens. 21 When the era of Prohibition ended
crime continued, highlighted now by the dubious activities of those who
had flourshed on a law that purported law-abiders mocked. They were
now as well able as the latter to hire legal counsel and they became the
first-class citizens of crime, paying for buffer lawyers to counter police
and prosecutors as no penniless or ignorant wretch could do. Another
generation would pass before we recognized a right to counsel for all,
and even then it took additional litigation to extend it to appeals. 2 2

17. See HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (Modern Library ed. 1950);
UPHANI, SALEM WrrcHcRAFr (American Classics ed. 1959).
18. See BOIES, PRISONERS AND PAUPERS 2 (1893); Kamisar, When Wasn't

There a "Crime Crisis"? (unreported speech given to the Twenty-eighth Conference of the Third Judicial Circuit of the United States on Sept. 9, 1965); see
also ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 165 (1935).
19. Hillyer, Prevention of Crime vs. Coddling the Criminal, 4 J. CRIm. L.,
C. & P.S. 453, 455 (1913); Spurr, The Third Degree, 16 Case & Com. 371, 374
(1910); see Comments of Charles Nott on Coddling the Criminal, 2 J. Calm. L.,

. & P.S. 108 (1911). See also Potter, The Privilege of Crime, 10 ME. L. REV. 117
(1917).
20. See Pam, Annual Address of the President of the Institute of Criminal
Lawo and Criminology, 10 J. CRM. L., C. & P.S. 327 (1919); Veiller, The Rising
Tide of Crime, 51 WORLD'S WORK 133 (1925-26); see Johnson, The Lawo Protects
the Criminal, Good Housekeeping, March 1927, p. 20.
21. See ALLsoP, THE BOOTLEGGERS AND fHEIR ERA 30-38 (1961); HIBBERT,
THE RooTs oF EvIL 331-338 (1963).
22. In 1932, the Supreme Court held that under special circumstances, a defendant in a capital case was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment rights by the
failure to appoint counsel to represent him. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
In 1942, the Supreme Court held in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), that
a state does not deprive a criminal defendant of due process by its failure to appoint counsel to represent him in felony cases unless it leads to a conviction lacking in "fundamental fairness." Such fundamental fairness might be lacking when
there were "special circumstances" that required the services of an attorney. The
special circumstances exception so vitiated the Betts doctrine, that there was
arguably a denial of due process every time the defendant might have been better
off had he had counsel. See Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962); Carnley
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962); Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960).
In cases involving capital offenses-a "circumstance" always requiring the appoint-
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Meanwhile the depression thirties came and went, and crime continued 2 World War II came and went, the Korean War came and went, and
crime continued." The fifties ushered in the beginnings of an affluent society,
but not the end of crime. We learned that it attended afRuence as it had
attended depression and the years of so-called normalcy.2 5
In the sixties we have soared in circles beyond the earth and travelled
in circles around the earth, but we have not put down crime at home. We
have wanted to soar and circle enough to devote all resources necessary to
those ends. We have had no such earnestness about getting at the causes
of crime so that we could move toward effective control. Too many people
have cavalierly dismissed the inquiry and research of knowledgeable
people, retailing instead the fanciful claim that due process rules are the
source of all our woes. 2
In the clamor against such rules we have lost sight of two overwhelming facts. First, they become relevant only in a small fraction of

rnent of counsel-the Court held that the right to counsel accrued at preliminary
hearing and arraignment. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961). There were further inroads on Betts in a series of
decisions holding that a defendant had an unqualified right to retain counsel at
his own expense. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Chandler v. Fretag,
348 U.S. 3 (1954). These cases, in conjunction with those protecting an indigent
from the discriminatory consequences of his poverty, see e.g. Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956), hastened the demise of Betts. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright:
The "Art" of Overruling in 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 211, 242-248. In 1963, Betts was
overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In a companion case, the
Supreme Court held that indigent criminal defendants were entitled to assigned
counsel on appeal. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); see also People v.
Brown, 55 Cal.2d 64, 69, 357 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1960); People v. Hyde, 51 Cal.2d
152, 154, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
23. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) (Investigation of the Matter of So-Called
"Rackets" With a View to Their Suppression) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Hearings];
VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY 1 (1935).
24. See Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Committee on the

Judiciary, 78th Cong., Ist Sess. 126 (1944) (Remarks of Congressman Sam Hobbs);
Newsweek, April 1, 1946, p. 24; Peterson, Restrictions in the Law of Search and
Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 46, 64 (1957); Waite, Why Do Our Courts Protect
Criminals, American Mercury, Jan. 1956, p. 55.
25. Hearings Before the House Committee on the District of Columbia, 88th

Cong., Ist Sess. 291 (1963) (Remarks of Stanley R. Schrotel, Chief of Police of
Cincinnati, Ohio); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights ot
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Ist Seas. 527 (1961); ABA,
SUMMARY

OF PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAw

103 (1961); Sondern,

Take the Handcufs Off Our Police, Reader's Digest, Sept. 1964, p. 64.
26. See Peterson, The Crooks Get All The Breaks, Saturday Evening Post,

Sept. 23, 1961, pp. 10, 13; U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 26, 1963, p. 38.
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cases that come to trial." Second, more often than not there are no useful
leads whatever to the criminal in a known crime and he disappears into a
sea of human beings as unrevealing as the sea itself. Sometimes when
a suspect is found the case against him cannot be substantiated and
the crime still remains unresolved. Moreover, we have no idea how much
crime goes unreported as well as unsolved. Law-abiders as well as outlaws
often report no evil that they have seen or heard."
If an unresolved crime is sensational enough, the public may grow
restless for any solution and become prey to indiscriminate suspicions
or fantasies of community control that would miraculously search out the
criminal or at least someone who bore a resemblance. Sooner or later,
however, depending on its emotional allure, the unresolved crime fades out
of people's minds. As to the cases that do go to trial, the public soon forgets the many that the state wins against the accused, either because he
pleads guilty or because the prosecution proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.2 9 Whatever the public emotion engendered by the trial, it
usually simmers down to righteous satisfaction once the accused is finally
adjudged guilty.
It is quite another story when a known suspect is accused and
brought to trial and then thwarts prosecution by pleading irregularities
in his detection, detention, or trial that compel exclusion of convincing

27. For example, a recent study of 1,000 indictments in New York State's
Kings County by Judge Nathan Sobel of the New York Supreme Court revealed
that confessions "constitute part of the evidence in less than 10 per cent of all indictments." The assertion "that confessions are essential to conviction in any sub-

stantial number of cases is simply carelessly nurtured nonsense." Sobel, The
Exrclusionary Rules in the Law of Con fessions, A Legal Perspective--A Practical
Perspective, Part VI, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 22, 1965, pp. 1, 4-5. Former New York City

Police Chief Michael Murphy, however, finds that confessions are essential to the

solution of 50 per cent of homicides. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1965, p. 1, col. 5.
See also report of study by staff of New York County District Attorney Frank
Hogan indicating that admissions had been made by 62 of 91 defendants in pending homicide cases and that 25 of these or 27 per cent could not have been indicted
had there been no confessions. N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 2, 1965, p. 31.
28. "Reluctance on the part of victims due to embarrassment, fear, low value

of property stolen, etc., are some of the reasons for this situation." U.C.R. 22.
29. Of 32,69 adult felony defendants in California in 1964, 65.5 per cent
pleaded guilty and an additional 25.6 per cent were found guilty by the judge or
jury; hence there was a total of 91.1 per cent convicted felony defendants. CALIFORNIA,

DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE,

DivisION

OF

LAw

ENFORCEMENT,

CRIME

IN

CALIFORNIA 121 (1964). See also, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the

District of Columbia, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 62-65 (1965); Pye, Reflections on Proposals for Reform in Federal Criminal Procedure, 52 GEo. L.J. 675, 679 (1964);
Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1964).
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evidence of guilt. Perhaps to black out the large failure to inquire into the
causes of crime, alarmists then rouse the public to righteous indignation
with a vengeance. Short shrift is made of the likelihood that an accused
who escapes on procedural rules and not on the merits will in time be
successfully prosecuted.30 Instead there is castigation of any court that
insists on applying rules and procedures consistently, regardless of who is
accused. 3 '
Those who call in bold stereotype for swift and severe punishment
have always been willing to tailor procedures to that objective. Why not
coerced confessions? they asked in an earlier day. Why not double jeopardy? Why not shortcut the Fifth Amendment?' 2
Many proposals emerged after World War I to make the punishment
fit the crimes, in a tenor suggesting that a court was an arm of the
police. As a Chicago judge typically put it, with no nonsense about constitutional rights: "A bit of extra-legal activity is better than having
vigilantes on the waterfront." 3 ' Innocuous as such extra-legal activity
sounds in miniature, the consequences would loom large indeed if every
judge took it upon himself to do his bit by pinchhitting as a vigilante
in the courtroom.
There were also vociferous calls for narrowing the period between
arrest and sentence to a week, or still better a day, and for cutting down

30. For example, of the first twenty-two defendants whose convictions were
reversed by the United States Supreme Court because their confessions introduced
at trial were coerced, eleven were subsequently reconvicted. See Ritz, Subsequent
Developments in Cases Reversed by the Supr~eme Court, 19 WAss. & LEE L. Ray.
202, 208-210 (1962).
31. Felons are permitted to "walk into court fearlessly and walk out to pursue their careers of crime-without punishment." Peterson, The Crooks Got AlL
The Breaks, Saturday Evening Post, Sept. 23, 1961, p. 10; see Wilson, Police Avthority in a Free Society, 54 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 175-177 (1963); Inbau, Public
Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand, 53 J. Calvs. L., C. &
P.S. 85, 86 (1962); Coakley, Restrictions in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. Ray.
2, 14-15 (1957).
32. See Carman, A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional Privileges From The
Criminal, 22 MINN. L. REv. 220 (1937); Comments of Curtis Lindley on Needed

Reforms in Criminal Law, 1 J. Cim. L., C. & P.S. 109 (July 1910); Spurr, The

Third Degree, 16 Case & Com. 371, 372 (1910); Stevens, ArchaicConsitutsionalProvisions Protecting the Accused, 5 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 16 (1914).
33. Chicago Tribune, Oct. 3, 1930, quoted in Note, 16 ST. Louis L. Ri.
148, 155 (1931). See Waite, Cooperation-Judiciaryand Police, 4 Mica. S.B.J. 273,
284 (1925).
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probation and parole." There were calls upon trial courts to nullify the
bail system, ostensibly to speed up justice."5 There was little concern
that without a bail system even those who were eventually acquitted
would meanwhile be subjected to punishment, 6 thus serving the dubious
lesson that those who erroneously get caught in the toils of the law must
pay for the error of the law's ways. The crime-conscious, in more than
one slip of the pen, revealed their preoccupation with the lawlessness of
"the more ignorant and vicious classes of the population." 7 They seemed
unaware of how ironically their own untutored strictures moved in vicious
circles.
The vagrant ways of such class subconsciousness found apt illustration in the thirties, when millions of unemployed were on the streets.
Vagrancy laws multiplied, void of meaningful definition and vague of
purpose. 8 It was even recommended that anyone who came within their
34. See Child, On the Criminal Side, Saturday Evening Post, April 15, 1940,
p. 24, 162; Howell, Inefficient Courts and the Crime Wave, 75 REVIEW OF REVIEWS
35 (1927); Johnson, supra note 10, at 216; Rose, Why Justice Limps in Pursuing
Crime, 60 Am. L. REv. 321 (1926); Sims, Fighting Crime in Chicago: The Crime
Condition, 11 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 20, 28 (1920).
35. See Veiller, How the Law Saves the Criminal, 51 WORLD'S WoRx 310, 316
(1925-26). Judge Learned Hand stated: "Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been haunted by the ghost of the innocent
man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic
formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime." United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
Commenting on the complaint that "the safeguards of the accused operate
as unreasonably technical obstacles to conviction of the guilty," Professor Dession observed that the notion is without foundation, "as all who have any experience in the trial of criminal cases well know. The prosecutor is normally assumed to represent right and justice, and on top of that he almost invariably enjoys far more investigative assistance and resources generally. But the notion persists." Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal
Lawo, S BUFFALo L. REV. 22, 40 (1950). See also Goldstein, The State and the
Accused.: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 60 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
36. In a profound study of the conflicting values in crime control Professor
Herbert Packer observes that those who hew to the line of speedy justice would
let the chips fall where they may for disciplinary purposes. Packer, Two Models
of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 39 (1964).
37. Editorial, The Coddling of Criminals, 8 VA. L. REG. 52, 56 (1922). See also
Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L.
REV. 442, 451 (1948).
38. See Note, Who Is a Vagrant in California? 23 CALIF. L. REV. 506 (1933);
Note, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1292 (1935). See also 1933 Hearings at 306-307 (Judge

Thomas Green of Chicago). Vagrancy statutes have remained popular in various
states even today. See Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J.
1 (1960); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old Concepts in Need of
Revision, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 557 (1960). They have been recently challenged on
the grounds that they are unconstitutionally vague and constitute punishment for
mere "status" rather than for a crime. See the dissent of Justice Douglas from the
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wide sweep should have the buroen of proving that he had a legitimate
job. 39 Such laws were often of little consequence to well-counselled racketeers engaged in illegitimate pursuits. It could be overwhelming for anyone unfortunate enough to have no job at all, and hence in no position
to make a convincing racket about invisible means of support. Perhaps
to close the gap between the illegitimately busy rich and the idle poor,
extremists proposed that any attorney be imprisoned who without a court
assignment undertook a criminal defense for pay and then lost it through
no fault but his client's. 4 0 In their view, guilt by association was bad
enough, but still worse when gilt-edged.
If public enemies roamed the land too often with impunity, at least
they were well-publicized and sooner or later many of them were brought
to justice if only because they could no longer evade the consequences of
tax evasion.4 1 There was no comparable publicity about how the police
proceeded to bring suspects to book. Dubious techniques came to light
only as determined lawyers fought occasional cases all the way to the
United States Supreme Court. They were techniques to chill even those
law-abiders who most fervently declare themselves for severe prosecution
and punishment.4 2 More frightening still, police officials defended such
techniques as in the normal course of their business.4* In the words of

dismissal of the writ of certiorari in Hicks v. District of Columbia (D.C. Cir. 1964),
cert. granted, 379 U.S. 998 (1965) (No. 711, Misc., 1964 Term; renumbered No. 51,
1965 Term), writ dismissed as improvidently granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3291 (U.S.
Feb. 28, 1966).
39. See 1933 Hearings at 135, 209.
40. See 1933 Hearings at 148. There was also alarm at post-conviction
remedies. In the view of Colonel Joseph A. Gerk, Chief of the St. Louis police
force, "resort to . . . writs of habeas corpus"~ was "embarrassing and retarding the
administration of justice." Id. at 283. In the view of J. Edgar Hoover prisons had
become "crime's law schools" and "hardened convicts" hunted for the "rat-holes"
of "legal technicalities" that might mean "freedom." Hoover, Crime's Law School,
American Magazine, Nov. 1940, p. 55.
41. See Johnson, Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal SystemPart II, 54 J. CaiNi. L., C. & P.S. 1, 16-18 (1963). The effectiveness of these early
tax evasion prosecutions can be seen in current criminal practices. "The mafiosi had
also learned four principles from the Capone era. . . . 1. Always have a good lawy'er. 2. Never plot or carry out violence against a federal officer. 3. Pay federal
income taxes. 4. Never trust anyone except a Sicilian mafioso." SONDERN, BROTHER.
HOOD OF EIL: THE MAFIA 69 (1959).

42. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Flori-

da, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See also
Brownell, It Could Happen to You, American Magazine, May 1949, p. 24.
43. Complaining about the exclusion of a confession "obtained after long
mental and physical fatigue," one police official stated "We are permitted to do
less every day. ...
Pretty soon there won't be a police department." Reported in
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one typical rationalization for violating the Constitution: "Nobody thinks
of hedging firemen about with a lot of restrictive laws that favor the
fire." 44 The analogy does not hold water. The firemen confront a catastrophe
taking place before their very eyes and can train their hoses on obvious
flames or smoke. In contrast, there are usually so many elements in the
scene of a crime that no single witness can assimilate them all, and often
witnesses conflict as to what happened. The police sometimes arrive on
the scene only after the crime has been perpetrated, sometimes long
after. Moreover, it should give caution that seemingly obvious suspects
sometimes prove to be innocent 45 just as the seemingly innocent sometimes
prove guilty. Even when appearances do not seem inscrutable, they can
still be deceiving.

There is another fatal defect in the fire analogy. We can fight fire
with fire, but it is intolerable to fight crime with crime. Precisely because
the police do not always track down criminals in full public view the
way firemen fight fires, we must have reasonable assurance that they will
not resort to lawless methods. 4 0 What assurance we have proceeds in
the main from rules of the United States Supreme Court. By indirection
these rules seek to deter activities of police or prosecutors that are
inimical to constitutional or other guarantees of a fair criminal process
but that are not subject to any punishment even when they disregard
an express prohibition. By the forties and early fifties such rules were
gathering force as the only noteworthy restraining influence on lawless
People v. Rogers, 303 Ill. 578, 588, 136 N.E. 470, 474 (1922). See also Inbau, The
Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV. 442
(1948); Peterson, "Case Dismissed," Atlantic Monthly, April, 1945, p. 69.
44. See Hopkins, The Lawless Arm of the Law, 148 Atlantic Monthly 279
(1931) (statement by Buffalo Police Commissioner Austin J. Roche).

See Sterling, Police Interrogation and tke Psychology of Confession, 14
3.PuB. L. 25 (1965). See generally BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1961);
45.

? RANK & FRANK, NOT GuILTrY (1957); KENNEDY, TEN RIHLINGTON PLACE (1961);
RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964); REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS (1959).
46. See, e.g., DEUTSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH CoPs 63 (1954); MYRDAL, AMERIcAN DILEMMA, 540-542, 975 (1944); SALISBURY, THE SHOOK-UP GENERATION 218223 (1938); Bain, Policemen and Children, 33 SocIoLOGY & SOCIAL RESEARCH 417,

418 (1949); Samuels, I Don't Think the Cop is My Friend, N.Y. Times, March

29, 1964, § 6 (Magazine) pp. 28, 30.
As early as 1931, United States Attorney General William D. Mitchell was
quoted as saying: "Nothing has a greater tendency to beget lawlessness than
lawless methods of law enforcement." Hopkins, The Lawless Arm of the Law,

Atlantic Monthly, Sept. 1931, pp. 279, 287; see Kamisar, On the Tactics of PoliceProsecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436, 456-458 (1964).
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police action. T' By the sixties they had become an influence of far-reaching
consequence, 4 s though still akin to that of permissive parents who now
and again announce a rule to improve behavior in the wake of particularly
reprehensible behavior about which someone has complained. 4 *
Such rules, designed to give meaning to the Constitution, are hardly
unreasonable. As Judge Henry J. Friendly puts it, in a critique by no
means blind to the imperfections that may be found in some judicial
opinions:
[T]here are few brighter pages in the history of the Supreme Court
than its efforts over the past forty years to improve the admin47. Thus the Supreme Court defined coercion to include a variety of factors
such as constant and prolonged interrogation, refusal to permit defendant to communicate with his friends and relatives, failure to inform defendant of his constitutional rights, deprivation of physical comforts, and psychological pressure.
See, e.g., Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 US. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 US.
49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 5% (1948); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.

227 (1940). It found a violation of due process when the police used conscience.
shocking methods such as stomach pumping to obtain evidence. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 163 (1952). Working within the confines of the rule in Bests v.
Brady, the Supreme Court held that in certain cases, the absence of counsel violated a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial. See, e.g., Palmer v. Ashe, 342

U.S. 134 (1951); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U.S. 437 (1948). Compare Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942);
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). When the police resorted to misrepresentation to obtain a guilty plea, the Supreme Court held that such action denied defendant the right to a fair trial. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
48. See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment by prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify violates due process); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) (Fourteenth Amendment makes Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
defendant's right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him" applicable to
the states); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel extended
to police interrogations); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of
confession must be decided by someone other than jury that tries issue of uilt);
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (compulsion of testimony
by one jurisdiction requires immunity from prosecution in all jurisdictions); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-in..
crimination applicable to the states); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)
(questioning of suspect after indictment in absence of counsel proscribed); White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (Sixth Amendment's right to counsel extended
to preliminary hearing in state courts); Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391 (1%3) (extension of federal habeas corpus for state prisoners); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963) (extension of right to evidentiary hearing for state prisoners in federal
habeas corpus proceeding); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)

(Sixth

Amendment's right to counsel made applicable to states); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule extended to states);
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (conviction devoid of evidentiary support is invalid under due process).
49. See Area, Criminl Procedure in 1964 ANNUAL SuiVE oF AMERICAN LAW
327 (1965); Bator, The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civi
Liberties Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REv. 457, 464-466 (1964).
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istration of criminal justice. How can any lawyer not be proud
of the decisions condemning convictions obtained by mob rule,
testimony known to the prosecutor to be perjured, coerced confessions, or trial by newspaper? There is nigh unanimous applause
for the insistence that persons charged with serious crime shall
receive the assistance of counsel at their pleas and trials. . . . [Tihe
fingers of one hand would outnumber the instances where I disagree
with decisions, as distinguished from opinions, in this area.5 0
Would that all court critics could articulate whatever disagreements
they have with decisions or opinions as dispassionately as this constructive
commentator proceeds to do. Then in a rational atmosphere we could get
down to cases and look up from them for the long-range view.
Instead, with each new judicial rule that strengthens guarantees
against oppressive procedures before trial, alarmists charge the courts
anew with criminal-coddling. An atmosphere thick with coddling charges
is rendered even thicker by the counter-irritating paeans in praise of
courts as if they were embarked on a crusade to enlarge a variety of
liberties ambiguously described as civil, as a bulwark against any and
all incivilities of an imagined police state. Nothing could be more misleading, for the courts take no such initiative. Far from being crusaders, they
must remain passively at attention, though clamor surround them, though
it reach their very windows. A court has no authority to mix in any
melee between those suspected of lawbreaking and the police. Only when
others take the initiative in submitting a case to it can it focus its attention on the details of a particular problem. 5 ' Only then can it utter words
that become a rule, and even then, only within the severe constraints of
law and custom that control jurisdiction.

In sum, no court can say what it pleases, let alone do what it
pleases. It cannot even speak at all unless it is spoken to. One can hence
note with some misgivings that the thin ranks of court defenders include
zealots who ignore the sober reasoning of judicial opinions in their zeal
to inflate judicial rules into soapbox slogans not only for liberth, cgalitc,

50. Friendly, The Bill of Rights As A Code Of Criminal Procedure, 53
L. REV. 929, 930-931 (1965).

CALIF.

51. See Bator, supra note 49, at 464 (courts work in an "episodic way" taking
only a "bite" of the problem); Packer, Policing the Police, New Republic, Sept. 4,
1965, pp. 17, 18.
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fraternited, and the spacing,"s or denial' 3 of paternitd, but also for any
other imaginable rights, privileges, immunities, and recreations of freewheelers with a bent for taking all the liberties they can.
A redeeming feature about such noise is that at least it suggests,
in however addled a manner, that there are two sides to the question of
judicial rules bearing upon pretrial procedures, in a debate still largely
dominated by those who hurl diatribes against the courts. All too many
in this dominant group are aware of how defenseless are their targets.
Lawyers at least, and well-informed journalists, know that a judge cannot
engage in a verbal free-for-all. He is reluctant to make even the most
dispassionate answer to even the most irresponsible diatribes. He is more
likely to nourish the hope that they may expend themselves in time.
In any event their rabid phrases, defying legal analysis, lend themselves
most appropriately to dissection by psychologists and semanticists.
The responsibility rests with lawyers less to join issue with irrational
attacks than to clear the air for intelligent and well-reasoned critiques
that are as essential to the development of the law as the judicial opinions
themselves. Although that responsibility has been borne nobly by a small
company of legal scholars, it is high time for the reinforcements that
are now appearing in the distance." Meanwhile, time has helped vindicate

52. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Calld 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956).
54. In his message to Congress on March 8, 1965, on the need to combat
crime (see 111 CONG. REc. 4253 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1965)) President Johnson
urged Congress to amplify federal law enforcement, to assist local law enforcement
agencies, and to appropriate funds to study the origins and nature of crime. N.Y.
Times, March 9, 1965, p. 1, col. 1. Thereafter a President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice was established composed primarily
of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials, judges, and professors. See
N.Y. Times, July 31, 1965, p. 1., col. 6. Congress also enacted the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 828, 18 U.S.C.-(
)) providing for federal grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to improve training programs for their personnel. In addition, the Act empowered the United States Attorney General "to make studies with respect to matters relating to law enforcement organization, techniques and practices, or the prevention or control of crime
. . . and to cooperate with and render technical assistance to State, local or other
public or private agencies, organizations, and institutions in such matters."
The President delivered a second major message on crime to Congress on
March 9, 1966. He stressed the importance of continued cooperation between the
state and federal governments under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act and
promised that grants would be made to state and local law enforcement agencies
to help recruit and train additional personnel. The President noted that the National Crime Commission was engaged in numerous studies to provide empirical
data on problems of crime and law enforcement. The elimination of those social
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the judicial rules of an earlier day designed to deter lawless state action
at the pretrial stage. Those who berate the courts now, driven to reformulate their censure, concentrate on the two most recent restraints on
such action. One might better speak of two restraining influences
exerted,
as in earlier cases, only in sequence of a legal challenge to the legality of
some pretrial state action in the criminal process.
Let us summarize these influences one after the other, and note in
sequence the vociferous reaction each has aroused. The first restraining
influence is the rule directed at unreasonable, hence unconstitutional searches
and seizures. It bears emphasis here, as with earlier deterring rules, that
there are no effective criminal sanctions against illegal police activity;
hence courts can do little to enforce prohibitions against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The most they can do is to exclude evidence that
has been thus obtained in violation of the Constitution. In 1961, in Mapp
v. Ohio,55 the United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule,
already applicable in federal courts, to all state courts.
The other restraining influence emanates from the rules governing
police interrogation of those accused of crime. Again, it bears emphasis
that courts are in no better position to enforce prohibitions against illegal
police interrogation than they are to enforce prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. Again, about the most they can do is to
exclude evidence at the trial that has been thus obtained illegally. Of the
two salient rules designed to exert this restraining influence on illegal
police interrogation, the first, enveloped in the McNabb" case of 1943 and
the reinforcing Mallory57 case of 1957, rested on the United States Supreme
Court's authority to monitor the administration of federal criminal justice.
The later rule of Escobedo v. Illinois"8 rested on constitutional grounds.

The McNabb-Mallory rule excluded in federal prosecutions any
statement elicited from the accused during an illegal detention, namely,
injustices that may be a cause of crime was also made a goal of the President's
program. See 112 CONG. REc. 5146 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1966).
Private organizations have also been active. The American Bar Foundation's
Survey of theA dministration of Criminal Justice in the United States has resulted
in the publication of LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION To TAKE A SUSPEcT INTO
CUSTODY (1965), and four other books are in preparation.

55. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

56. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
57. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
58. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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a detention violatng the tederal rule that an arrested person be brought
before a magistrate without unnecesary delay. The Escobedo rule extended
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, already applicable to criminal
prosecutions in state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment, to police
interrogations. Hence the rule excludes from state as well as federal trials,
statements of the accused elicited by police interrogation
where .

.

. the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into

an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect,
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out
a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent.

. .

There was a formidable hue and cry against courts following the
Mapp v. Ohio rule extending to state processes the United States Supreme
Court's restraining influence against unconstitutional searches and seizures.
The wailing reached a feverish pitch following the Escobedo ruleW reaching beyond the earlier McNabb-Mallory rulee1 to exert a restraining inm59. Id. at 490-491.
60. "Most police and prosecutors heatedly argue they are rapidly losing legal
ground in their battle against lawlessness." Wall Street Journal, Nov. 26, 1965,
p. 1, col. 1. "l]t is time we gave . . . [the police] some weapons by which they
can try and safeguard the honest citizens which is the purpose of the entire police
force." Hearings before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1965). "The abusive decisions . . . are largely distillations
about 'rights of the guilty,' which support technicalities of little practical value in
protecting the innocent." Wall Street Journal, April 26, 1965, p. 6, cols. 1-2. See,
e.g., Parker, A Lawman's Lament, 40 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 603 (1965); Powell,

An Urgent Need.' More Effective Criminal Justice, 51 A.B.A.J. 437, 439 (1965).
Compare Hoover, Police Problems, 7 STr. JoHN L. REv. 46, 54 (1932) witk Hoover,
address given at Loyola University, Nov. 24, 1964, reported in 111 CONG. Rac.

A511 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1965).
61. "[T~he ruling . . . is one of the greatest handicaps that has ever confronted law-enforcement officers." Hearings Before Subcommittes No. 2 of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1944) (remarks of
Major Edward Kelly, Superintendent of Police in the District of Columbia). "In
the opinion" of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, "the effect of
the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the McNabb case" was "to render
law enforcement procedures so difficult that it will be practically impossible to
maintain law and order and to satisfactorily protect our citizens against criminal
activities." Id. at 43. "[Tlhe Mallory decision affects law enforcement to this extent, that most of the murders, the rapes, and robberies that I have come in contact with would have gone unsolved and unpunished under the Mallory decision."
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1958) (remarks of Police Chief
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fluence on police interrogation. One might have thought from the hue
and cry that it was a hu e cri against felons who had made away with the
last rounds of ammunition held by law-abiders besieged on all sides by
lawbreakers who made up in monstrosity what they lacked in numbers.
There was rarely a pause for perspective. The monsters in the headlines
towered over any earthworms who made the scene by developing a harmless new wriggle or by taking an abrupt twist for the worse. Anyone who
did take a panoramic view was bound to note that virtually no one had
actually seen policemen in handcuffs. Anyone who followed their activities
closely knew that they were still quite able to handcuff others and that
they did so when necessary. Moreover anyone who could understand law
reports and still troubled to read them knew that courts, however scrupulously they conduct a criminal trial in accord with the Constitution and
rules of law, still waste no encouraging words of sentimentality on criminals.
Articulate comment about the Mapp rule directed at unconstitutional
searches and seizures was drowned out in the din about handcuffing the
police. 2 At best, complained the foes of the rule, it was "misguided sentimentality." 8 Usually they denounced it as much worse, as a danger to
"social safety"" or even as an aid to a "predatory army." 5 A relatively
charitable comment that no "intelligent human being in all the world
except a judge""*would subscribe to such a rule, seems at least indirectly
to concede that a judge can have intelligence, leaving to the reader the
innuendo that it is occupationally warped.
There has been a great deal of woofing about that occupational warp.
There is loud dismay that judges far removed from the jungle of crime
are in earnest that the mantle of the Constitution falls becomingly even
Robert Murray of the District of Columbia). See also Scott, The Mallory Decision
and thes Vanishing Rig/at: of Crime Victims, 4 Police 28 (July-Aug. 1960); Waite,
Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence-Resuldts of the McNabb Case, 42 MICH. L.

Raey. 909 ( 194 ) .

62. See ABA,

SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW

103

(1961) (remarks of Keith Mossman, then Executive Vice President of the National District Attorneys' Association); Wilson, Police Authority in a Free Society,
54

J. Casks.- L., C.f & P.S. 175 (1963).

63. 8 WIGMORE § 2184 at 36 (3d ed. 1940).
64. Waite, Arrest of Felons, 31 MICH. L. REV. 749, 765-766 (1933).

65. See Parker, The Cahan Decision Made Life Easier for tke Criminal,
in Parker, Police 113, 115, 120 (Wilson ed. 1957); Peterson, Restrictions in the Law

of Search and Seizure, 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 46-47 (1957).
66. Carman, A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional Privileges from the
Criminal, 22 MINN. L. REV. 200, 206 (1937).
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on the creatures who roam the jungle. The emotional argument goes that
in protecting the rights of creatures who have shown no respect for the
rights of others, the judges have not only left the side of the angels but
have taken sides with the apes. The implication is clear that the best
way to deal with apes is to ape them. 7
More than one scholar has pointed out how frequently the alarmists
invoke the sordidness of criminals to justify the view that the police
should be free from the restraining influence of the most recent judicial
rules. 68 Rarely do they say aloud, though logic would compel it, that the
police should then be free of much more. Thus, though they have no hesitation in decrying the judicial rule excluding evidence obtained in unreasonable searches and seizures,69 they are loath to state the logical
corollary affirmatively. It must appear even to them as a question:
Should the police be free of the restraining influence of the Constitution,
of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures? Sub rosa, their answer must be yes; else they have no argument
against the judicial rule operating as a sanction for the Fourth Amendment.o
They cannot forever make their argument half public and half sub
rosa. They cannot forever openly abuse the judicial rule without also
openly abusing the Constitution. Meanwhile they seek to allay public misgivings about unreasonable searches and seizures by blowing the bellows
on public concern about crime. Should the guilty go free, they ask, when
they could be convicted if only the courts would admit illegally obtained
evidence?"

67. The classic statement against this view was made by Justice Brandeis in
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion). See also
Hall, Police and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 159, 176 (1953).
68. See Hall, supra note 67, at 153, 159-161; Packer, Two Models of the
Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 24-26, 39 (1964); Wechsler, A Caveat on
Crime Control, 27 J. CRanI. L., C. & P.S. 629, 635-636 (1937). See also TREBACH,
THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE, 54-58, 232 (1964).

69. "Instead of welcoming an affirmation of an important constitutional right
and turning promptly to the task of training police officers in the law which they
are sworn to uphold and obey, the outcry was against the strictures of the new
law." Steinberg, A Comparative Examination of the Role of the Criminal Lawyer

in Our Present-Day Society, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 479, 490 (1964).
70. See Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts and "Policing the
Police," 53 j. CRtIM. L., C. & P.S. 453, 455-456 (1962); Paulsen, The Exclusionary
Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 255-256 (1961); cf.
Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49
CORNELL

L.Q. 436, 445-446 (1964).

71. "Let the police have the authority to do what the public expects them to

do in suppressing crime. If we followed some of our court decisions literally, the
public would be demanding my removal as Superintendent of Police and-I might
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There are no easy answers to hard questions.
The hard answer is in the United States Constitution as well as
in state constitutions. They make it clear that the guilty would
go free if the evidence necessary to convict could only have been
obtained illegally, just as they would go free if such evidence were
lacking because the police had observed the constitutional restraints upon them.7 2
Let no one conclude that judges are insensitive to public concern
with crime or to the possibility that the guilty may go free when illegally
obtained evidence against them is excluded. They are all too aware of
it, but they are also aware that what is at stake is not the advantage to
the accused in the particular case but the security to be preserved for all
law-abiders against unreasonable searches and seizures. "The understandably impatient law-abiders, who approve official retribution without
restraint against wrongdoers, do not visualize themselves as the objects
of oppressive government action in any near future. Not for them are
the warnings of history." 73 It is for the judges, through the enforcement
of judicial rules, to remind law-abiders that courts stand not only between
them and the excesses of lawbreakers, but also between them and the
excesses of government. The rule directed against illegal searches and
seizures, for example, gives assurance to every law-abider of first-class
protection for his first-class mail. He may take the right to such protection for granted, but it required trial and a judicial rule to vindicate it."'
A law-abider can best grasp the significance to him of such rules by imagining how precariously situated he would be without them. Officers of the
state could then lawlessly break open his mailbox as well as his mail;
they could break down his door as lawlessly as his mailbox; they could
seize his records and other belongings as lawlessly as they made entry;
they could lawlessly search his very person.

More than one judge dismayed by the excesses of lawbreakers has
also had reason to be dismayed by the excesses of government.
add-with justification." Wilson, Police Authority in a Free Society, 54 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 175, 177 (1963). See also Wilson, Two Virms of Chicago-I. How the
Police Chief Sees It, Harper's, April 1964, pp. 140, 144.
72. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DL'KE L.J.

319, 322.
73. Id. at 3 19.
74. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The protection for first-class mail
has recently been codified. 74 Stat. 657, 39 U.S.C. § 4057 (1964).
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It is a large assumption that the police have invariably exhausted
the possibilities of obtaining evidence legally when they have relied upon illegally obtained evidence. It is more rational to assume
the opposite when the offer of illegally obtained evidence becomes
routine. It was the cumulative effect of such routine that led
[the California Supreme Court] at last in the case of People v.
Cakan to reject illegally obtained evidence. It had become all too
obvious that unconstitutional police methods of obtaining evidence
were not being deterred in any other way. We summed up the
sorry experience that led us to conclude that the exclusionary rule
was now imperative: We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies have completely failed to secure
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under the
old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in
effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers." 5
It is not easy for a judge to overrule himself as I did in People v.
Cahan,'7 after thirteen years of confronting evidence from flagrantly unreasonable searches and seizures. In a series of cases thereafter the court
set about to formulate common-sense standards of reasonableness, and it
soon became apparent that there was ample latitude left to the police for
search and seizure within reasonable bounds." Action within such bounds
requires more thought but not necessarily more trouble than lawless action.
The great advantage of police compliance with the law is that it
helps create an atmosphere conducive to a community respect for officers
of the law that in turn serves to promote their enforcement of the law.e
Once they set an example of lawful conduct they are in a position to set
up lines of communication with the community and to gain its support.
There is hope in the paradox that more than one neighborhood has opened
its doors to the police when confidence has spread that the police will not
lawlessly force them open. It is easier for them by far to track down a

75. Traynor, supra note 72, at 322.

76. 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P2d 905 (1955).
77. See Draper, The Cahan Case and Probable Casse, 34 CALIF. S.B.J. 251;
Note, Two Years with the Cahan Rule, 9 STAN. L. REv. 515 (1957).
78. See RUBIN, THE LAW OF CHlMINAL CORRECTION 434 (1963); SMrra,
POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNIrED STATEs 1043 (2d rev. ed. 1960); SUTHERLAND &
CRESSEY, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLoGY, 326, 340-341 (6th ed. 1960); Foote, Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 44 (1957).

LAWBREAKERS,

COURTS, AND LAW-ABIDERS

479

suspect in such an environment, without recourse to lawless action, than
m an environment whose hostility thwarts them at every turn.W
The exclusionary rule of Mapp raises the standard of justice not only
in reputedly bad neighborhoods, where illegal searches and seizures have
most commonly occurred, but in purportedly good ones. An officer of the
law who suffers a reproval, however indirect, for an illegal search or
seizure involving even the most likely suspect in the most disreputable
neighborhood, receives a warning that may redound to the benefit of even
the most likely law-abider in the most reputable neighborhood. That lesson
has come home with a vengeance to erstwhile decryers of court rules.
The rules discouraging lawless search and seizure in the detection of lawbreakers may be invoked by those whose suspected antisocial behavior
lies in nothing more sordid than tax returns.8 0 This unexpected development
has dramatized the reach of the rules. They extend their guarantees not
merely to violent outlaws, not merely to nonviolent lawbreakers, but a
fortiori to law-abiders. The basest wretch who vindicates such guarantees
vindicates them also for his betters.
We turn now to the McNabb-Mallory rule and the later Escobedo
rule, designed to exert a restraining influence on secret police interrogation. There has been little abatement of the hostility to the McNabbMallory rule aimed at limiting police detention before arraignment within
lawful bounds.8 1 That hostility has merged with the hostility to the
Escobedo rule, which now bears the brunt of the fire.

79. The lack of community cooperation with the police has been evident in

is made amid a crowd of bystanders. For example
Chief of Police Schrotel of Cincinnati recently stated that "people assembled as
spectators where an arrest is being made tend to side with the prisoner" and
situations where an arrest

"sometimes . . . openly attack the police in an attempt to free the prisoner."
Will City Streets Ever Be Safe Again?, U.S. News & World Report, April 8, 1963,
p. 80. See also ABA, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF SEcTION OF CRIMINAL LAW
20 (1962).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Lipshitz, 132 F. Supp. 519 (E.D.N.Y. 1955);
United States v. Warlich, 129 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The growing use of
miniature tape recorders and electronic "bugging" devices has increased the concern of the law-abiders that the individual be protected from a lawless search. See
Osborn v. United States, 350 F.2d 497 (1965), cert. granted 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3266
(No. 724, 1966); 112 CONG. REc. 1581 (daily ed. Feb. 1. 1966); 111 CONG. REC.
25504 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1965); 111 CONG. REc. 23848 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1965).
81. "The Mallory rule has crippled our police in their efforts to protect the
community. It increases the difficulties of law enforcement, and also encourages increased lawlessness." Hearings before Senate Committee on the District of Co-

lumbia, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 397 (1963) (remarks of Robert E. McLaughlin, President of the Citizens Crime Commission of Metropolitan Washington, D.C.); see
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These rules seek to reconcile the practices of pretrial interrogation
with the Fifth Amendment's injunction against compulsory self-incrimination by excluding at the trial evidence obtained via illegal police interrogation. They present a dilemma akin to the one presented by the exclusionary
rule directed against illegal searches and seizures, namely, that an accused
who is guilty may go free if the only evidence of his guilt has been obtained
illegally. Again, the United States Supreme Court has undertaken to
read the hard answer in the Constitution itself. What the Fifth Amendment radiates is an antipathy, born of experience, to inquisition. 8 ' We
know those radiations well in the judicial system. No person, whatever
his guilt, need incriminate himself at a trial. However revolting his
crime, he need never confess it. He is armored with the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination even though he is well protected against
abusive inquisition by an impartial judge and by the openness of the
proceeding. Reasonable men can quarrel, as some have,83 with the wisdom
of such a privilege when there is such protection against abuse. They can
extend the quarrel to the use or abuse of the privilege in legislative investigations." They would hardly advocate vitiating the privilege, however, by
secret inquisition.8 5
The problem remained largely an academic one until the Escobedo
case. Those charged with law enforcement were not much troubled about a
constitutional injunction that was enforced only in a courtroom." They
could still undertake secret interrogation largely free of the restraints
that attend interrogation in open court. The accused might be alone with
no friend or counsel to advise him, no judicial officer to safeguard his
rights, and no witnesses except police officers to testify as to what occurred.
Knebel, Washington, D.C., Portrait of a Sick City, Look, June 4, 1963, pp. 15, 19.
For a discussion of congressional reactions to the McNabb-Mallory rule, see Ho an

& Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale and Rescue, 47 GEO. L.J.
1, 33-46 (1958). See also Bickel, Fighting Crime, New Republic, Sept. 18, 1965,
p. I1.
82. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
83. The classic critique is still BENTWHM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE

(1827).
84. Compare Meltzer, Invoking the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and
Practical Considerations, 9 BULL. ATOMIC ScI. 176 (1953), with Kalven, Invoking
the Fifth Amendment-Some Legal and Impractical Considerations, 9 BULL.
AToNuC ScI. I8I (1953).

85. See McNaughton, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, Its Constitstional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscellaneous Implications, 51 J. CalM. L.,
C. & P.S. 138, 151-152 (1960).
86. Sutherland, Crime and Confession, 79 HARv. L. REV. 21, 36-37 (1965).
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Patently it was an innovation of consequence when the Escobedo
rule extended to the pretrial stage, through the right to counsel, some
assurance of the openness that attends a trial. It can be viewed as an
effort to close the long-standing gap between the scrupulous observance
of the privilege against self-incrimination at trial and its neglect at the
pretrial stage.87 We can have little quarrel with its objective, to serve as
a restraining influence against secret inquisition. It suffers of course the
handicap of kindred judicial rules: at best it can discourage illegal pretrial
activities, but it can do little to stop them. 8 A restraint that is merely
inadequate, however, may be better than none.

Escobedo presents problems as to its scope, however, that could prove
intractable, as judges and law enforcement agencies strive to apply its
olympian text to the local scene. Moreover, it may operate blindly to exclude confessions elicited without improper inquisition. Its most hopeful
aspect is that it may serve to expedite a thoroughgoing examination of
our pretrial procedures and a much-needed reconciliation of theory and
practice in everyday terms.
There will still be some who would not extend the due process that
seems so proper for proper people to those of unsavory mien; in their view
it should operate as a sorting machine. If we believe in abiding by the
law, however, we cannot tolerate any rejects in its operation. What is
due, is due even the devil. Concededly it is not easy to see a devil go
free for the moment, and on occasion forever, instead of going to jail,
adding insult to his lack of injury by the guilty look on his face. It behooves
us to note, however, that there are as yet no empirical studies indicating
a correlation between whatever rules of law courts enforce for the protection of the accused and the crimes that criminals perpetrate. Moreover,
those who equate due process rules with coddling of criminals have failed
dismally to explain why crime flourishes even when there is no such socalled coddling, even when there is evidence of the very opposite.8 9
87. See Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944).
88. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule--Part 1: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 421441 (1965); Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52
CalM. L., C. & P.S. 255, 264 (1962).

J.

89. See NATIONAL [WICKERSHAM) COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVATION AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT No. 11 ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931).
1961 COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTs REPORT bk. 5, JUSTICE 26; SMITH, POLICE
SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATEs 324 (2d rev. ed. 1960).
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What of the most outrageous crimes, the crimes that engender universal horror? If we stop to think, we cannot but reflect that one so
insensate as to commit such a crime will hardly have been animated to
do so by salient rules in the law reports on issues of constitutional import.o
The so-called technical rules are phrased in technical language beyond
the ken of the insensate.e1 We must recall also that before there were
such rules the majority of crimes, for lack of physical clues or even clues
as to motivation, still never reached even the police station, let alone
the courts. As to known crimes and criminals, the sobering fact is that we
may all be closer to them than we imagine. The Uniform Crime Reports
inform us, for example, that eighty per cent of all murders are committed
by members of the victim's family or by his friends. A law-abider in the
company of friends or relatives should not feel easy if they make the
homespun announcement, as is their wont, that they would like to murder
him. All too often they do.
The law-abiders are up against a reckoning on many fronts. For all
the emphasis on sensational crime, they can hardly overlook such rampant
everyday crime as lifting from shops, from hotels, or from industrial
plants, to say nothing of such filching as plagiarism. They cannot forever
ignore the scoff-law cynicism of large-scale embezzlers or jugglers of accounts or price-fixers who explain away their dubious activities, in the
event of discovery, as mere "unfortunate episodes," a term now in great
vogue.9 2 Nor can the law-abiders remain forever heedless of contemporary
polls indicating the public's high tolerance for all manner of cheating outside the bounds of lawful behavior. 3 They cannot forever avoid inquiry
90. "The lawyer . . .often has little psychological insight and little acquaintance with the sort of persons who most frequently come into conflict with the
law. So he can easily lose sight of the irrational factors in human motivation and
construct psychologically superficial explanations, based on a view that crime grows
out of conscious, rational consideration as to what is most profitwble." Andenaea,
General Prevention--illusionor Reality, 43 J. CRaM. L., C. & P.s. 176, 178 (1952).
91. U.C.R. 7; Andenaes, srupra note 90, at 188-189; Gardener, The Purposes of
Criminal Punishment, 21 MODERN L. REV. 117, 125 (1958); Watson, A Critique
of the Legal Approach to Crime, and Correction, 23 LAW & CONTEM P. PROB. 611,
619 (1958).
92. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 534 n.1 (1965) (fraud in the sale of farming
equipment); FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS (1962) (electrical industr
price-fixing); N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1964, section 3, p. 1, col. 2 (vegetable ol
scandal). See generally SUTHERLAND, WHrrE COLLAR CRIME (1949); Newman,
White.Collar Crime, 23 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 735 (1958); Crime in a White
Collar, 204 EcoNoMIs 620 (1962).
93. See JASPEN, THE THIEF IN THE WHrrE COLLAR (1960); Cook, The Corrupt
Society, 196 THE NATION 453 (1963).
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into the causes of white-collar crime any more than of back-alley crime, if
they are as alarmed at crime as they profess.
Lawbreakers in these stations of crime are sometimes quite capable
of reading and understanding judicial rules. Who would generalize that they

have embarked upon their unfortunate episodes only after a careful
reading of the judicial rules bearing on procedures in criminal detection,
detention, and trial? Suppose so unlikely a reader; he would have to
search through countless pages to come upon the rules, and in the process
he would come upon more than enough countervailing instances of swift

and severe punishment.
Moreover, the law-abiders must confront the well-known secret that
much aberrant behavior defined as crime never comes to light either because of the discreetness of the perpetrators or the protectiveness of their
group or because the behavior bears embarrassingly close resemblance to
that of many people who pride themselves on being law-abiders. They
must confront the mortifying fact that in some crimes requiring collaborators, such as prostitution and gambling, reputed criminals have the

collaboration of reputed law-abiders."

They must further confront the

mortifying fact that the proceeds of such crimes feed the gangsters of organized crime, enabling some of them to advance from their sordid enterprises to the ranks of legitimate business.95
It seems reasonable to conclude that the blame for crime lies elsewhere than with the courts." Some part of the blame rests with the so-called

94. Illegal gambling establishments are crowded with patrons. See N.Y. Times,
March 31, 1965, p. 1, col. 4. Although the customer or a prostitute is guilty of an
offense under most state statutes, see, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE, § 266(e), he is rarely
prosecuted.
95. "Infiltration of legitimate business by known hoodlums has progressed to
an alarming extent in the United States. The Committee uncovered several hundred
instances where known hoodlums, many of them employing the 'muscle' methods
of their trade, had infiltrated more than seventy types of legitimate business."~
KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA 16 (1961). For an illuminating discussion of such infiltration by organized crime, see SPECIAL SENATE CONM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THIRD INTERIM REPORT 17-SI (19501951). The underworld has "obtained such holdings by investing money received
from illicit enterprises; and by force, terror and the corruption of management,
union and public officials." SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE
LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, FINAL REPORT, Part 4, at 856 (1960). See also
ABA, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAw ENFORCEMENT 20 (1952-53); U.S.

News & World Report, March 20, 1964, pp. 74-76.

96. David Acheson, then United States Attorney for the District of Columbia,
observed in a 1964 address: "Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most
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law-abiders who have winked at some crimes while castigating others,
or who have themselves been less than respectful toward officers of the
law on the highways or elsewhere. In some measure the public is to
blame for having done so little to institute or support long-range measures
of crime control, beginning with the formulation of modem codes of criminal
law and procedure in every state. No one is more aware than a judge that
judicial rules fall short of the comprehensive guidance that law officers
should have. There is hope in the offing of such guidance; the American
Law Institute, for example, is at work on a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure. Until the public rouses itself to adopt such reforms, however,
the courts have no alternative but to fill in the breach by formulating
whatever guidelines they can from one isolated case to another, usually of
constitutional tenor. 97
There are of course differences among judges on rules of criminal
procedure as on some of the other issues of our time. Nevertheless they
must honor the established law of the land, regardless of their own views.
The state courts are bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, just as the trial courts of a state are bound by the decisions of its
appellate courts. Because of that obligation our country lives up to its
name, the United States. The alternative would be disunity that might culminate in anarchy.

Meanwhile we must clear the air of misleading statements about
the police as well as about courts. It is as irrational to make inflammatory
generalizations from recurring instances of police lawlessness as it is to
attack the courts for the rules directed against such lawlessness. The police
are no more the enemies of the people than the courts are friends of criminals.
Though time may be working against crime, including organized crime
and white-collar crime, through increasingly sharp scientific detection
and computerized records, our police officers still have a heroic job to do.
Why not enlarge our own concepts, as well as theirs, of our common responsibilities? Why not recruit them in adequate numbers, at compensation
remote causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution
procedure would have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would
have on a tumor of the brain." Acheson, Remarks at the Semi-annual Meeting,
Central Eastern Area Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board, Boiling Air Force
Base, October 15, 1964, p. 4. The speech is reported in the Washington Post, Oct.
16, 1964, p. 3, col. 4. See also Washington Post, March 26, 1960, p. D, cul. 7 (remarks of then United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, Oliver Gasch).
97. See Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1019-1022 (1965).
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appropriate to the qualifications and training they must have to do their
job properly?"
The truth of the matter is that countless law enforcement officers, as
well as judges, are setting an example of respect for the law as they go
about their respective tasks. They have the responsibility of dealing fairly
even with criminals in bringing them to justice. They must also convey
the importance of fair procedure to those who seem hardly to abide the
law. Daily they uphold the law that in the long run militates against lawbreakers of every sort. Daily they give meaning to the concept of a lawabiding society. They can only hope that it is not lost forever to the lawbreakers or ever lost entirely to those who pride themselves on abiding by
the law.

98. See, e.g., Brereton, The Importanc-e of Training and Eduration in the
Professionalization of Law Enforcemcnt, 52 J. CRIN1. L., C. & P.S. 111 (1961);
Gourley, State Standards for Local Police Recruitment and Training, 53 J. CRIM.
L., C. & P.S. 522 (1962); Misner, Mobility and the Establirhment of a Carcer System in Police Personnel Adminirtration, 54 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 529.

Tax Savings From

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS
By Martin S. Stolzoff of Beverly Hills
Substantial income tax savings can be realized from
thoughtful planning of real estate activities. The first opportunity for income tax savings arises at the time of
purchase when part of the down payment can represent
prepaid interest. A cash basis purchaser has been allowed
to deduct up to five years prepaid interest.1 The seller must
report the prepaid interest as ordinary income for the year
received. 2 The purchaser should provide that if there is a
prepayment of principal in a later year that the unearned
prepaid interest can be credited to principal. This will result
in ordinary income to the purchaser when unearned prepaid
interest is applied towards principal. Also on a sale of the
property any payment to the seller on account of prepaid
interest previously paid by the seller must be reported by
the seller as ordinary income. 3
If the purchase includes personal property, such as furniture, the taxpayer is entitled to a bonus depreciation deduction of 20% of the amount of such purchase up to total
purchases of $10,000 in any taxable year, or a bonus depreciation of up to $2,000.4 If the taxpayer is married, he
is entitled to a bonus depreciation deduction of 20% of the
amount of such purchases up to a total amount of up to
$20,000 per year, or up to a $4,000 bonus depreciation deduction.5 To qualify for this deduction, the property must have
an estimated useful life of at least six years.
In addition, a taxpayer is entitled to investment tax credit
of up to 7% of purchases of certain personal property which
has an estimated life of at least eight years6 and to a reI. T. 3740, 1945 C. B. 109 Konigsberg, 5 T.C.M. 48. J. D. Fackder,
39 B.T.A. 395-, Dec. 10, 596 (Acq.) .

21 R. C. Section 451. U. S. Treas. Reg. 1.451-1(b). U. S. Treas.
Reg. 1.61-7 (a).
'Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 C. B. 143 (The unearned interest when
applied to principal must be included in income only to the extent
that the deductions taken for such interest in the year of payment
resulted in a tax benefit.)
'I. R. C. Section 179.
I. R. C. Section 179(b).
* I. R. C. Section 38. 1. R. C. Section 46 (The credit cannot exceed
the taxpayer's liability for tax in excess of $25,000 plus 25 percent of
the excess over $25,000 but any unused credit can be carried back
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